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Climate change and the process of migration to Europe
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Abstract
The refugee crisis which began in 2015 showed that Europe and the EU are not prepared 
for the challenges of the future. Several studies are also coming to the conclusion that 
climate change will have a huge impact on movements of migration from Africa to 
Europe. By the year 2050, approximately 86 million people will be forced to flee from 
their country of origin as a consequence of climate change, mainly in Sub-Saharan and 
East Africa. Significant migration movements are expected to be the result. This paper 
aims to anticipate possible refugee inflows from Africa and attempts to outline a set of 
recommendations as to how mass migration to Europe could be avoided. For this purpose, 
the effects of climate change, demographic development, politics, and economics are 
taken into consideration with a case study on Sub-Saharan Africa. The article shows that 
displacement will not only affect Africa but also Europe, absent effective policy changes. 
However, early crisis prevention could stop mass migration to Europe. Nevertheless, 
climate change can only be tackled to a certain extent, and decision makers have to find 
ways on how to deal with this issue. Especially, urbanization programs in rural, but 
livable, regions could be a solution. Overall, European refugee policy has to change 
significantly, as the ongoing refugee crisis has the potential to disrupt European 
integration.
Keywords: migration, refugees, climate change, Europe, Africa, droughts, rising sea 
level
Introduction
The aim of this paper is to analyze migration and refugee movements to Europe as a 
consequence of climate change in Africa, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa. According 
to the World Climate Conference 2017, there are already more “climate refugees” than 
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“war refugees”. This issue is becoming more and more relevant - especially in light of the 
current refugee crisis in Europe. The research questions of this paper are: How does 
climate change affect the process of migration from Africa to Europe? What are the 
(possible) consequences of this development? And how can mass refugee movements be 
avoided? The link between climate change and migration is investigated on the basis of 
empirical data and through two case studies: Sub-Saharan Africa and East Africa, two
regions significantly affected by climate change. 
We can see that Africa is by far the fastest growing continent on the planet in terms 
of population size, while also being the continent which is most compromised by climate 
change, making it increasingly less habitable – issues such as sea level rise, droughts, and 
the underproduction of crops together adversely affect habitability. According to the 
World Bank, by the year 2050, approximately 140 to 150 million climate refugees will 
leave the African continent (World Bank, 2018). While it is true that not all of them will 
come to Europe, without a change in European refugee and climate policies, this 
development has the potential to disturb or even reverse the European integration process.
Literature review
Climate change and global warming are documented scientific facts. The evidence is 
overwhelming and the correlation between CO2 emissions and mean temperature cannot 
be interpreted in a different way. The CO2 emission level increased gradually from 
slightly above 310 ppm in 1959 to above 400 ppm in 2015. Furthermore, the global mean 
temperature has also been increasing continuously, in line with the increase in CO2
emissions (EFJ, 2017: 8).  
Debate about numbers
The estimations concerning future climate refugees are very different. Thus, the debate 
about figures is very controversial and estimates vary from 31 to 200 million climate 
refugees by the year 2050. One of the first researchers in this field is Norman Myers. In 
his research papers from 1995 and 2005, he mentioned for the first time the number of 
200 million climate refugees (Myers, 1995 & 2005) – a figure that is oft-cited in the 
climate debate and by NGOs. According to Myers, the main causes for migration as a 
consequence of environmental changes are the disruptions of monsoon systems, droughts, 
sea-level rise and coastal flooding. However, from the onset there was a disagreement 
with Myers’ estimates. One of his critics is Stephen Castles  from Oxford University’s 
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International Migration Institute,  who,  in  an  interview  in  2013,  stated  that  Myers’ 
methods are inadequate, since he assumed that every person who is affected by the rising 
sea-level would flee (Barnes, 2013).
Recent predictions by the World Bank in their report “Groundswell: Preparing for 
Internal Climate Migration” (2018) estimated that, in the worst case, there will be around 
143 million climate refugees globally by the year 2050 – around 86 million from Sub-
Saharan Africa, 40 million from South Asia, and 17 million from Latin America.  
Nevertheless, the World Bank has also drawn up more optimistic scenarios. In the “more 
inclusive development” scenario,  the figures vary from 65 to 105 million refugees and 
the “more climate-friendly” scenario predicts between 31 and 72 million refugees. In all 
cases, however, the regions which will be predominantly affected by climate change are 
Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and Latin America. Therefore, 55 percent of the 
developing world’s population is expected to be under threat of forced displacement in 
the coming decades. The reasons for this are lower water availability and crop 
productivity and coastal areas becoming uninhabitable due to rising sea levels and storm 
surges. Consequently, climate sensitive sectors and infrastructure will be hit hardest by 
climate change, and  the poorest part of the population is likely to suffer the most as a 
result of this (World Bank, 2018: 9-10).
A study conducted by Greenpeace and the University of Hamburg (Jakobeit and 
Methmann, 2007) concluded that the number of refugees who had to flee because of 
climate  change  already  surpassed  the  amount  of  “official  refugees”  – those seeking 
asylum for political reasons, or who have had to flee from war. According to the study, 
the main indicators of climate change are droughts and limited access to water in Africa, 
and rising sea levels in the Pacific Ocean. Furthermore, the authors found that not only 
less developed regions are affected by climate change, but also highly developed regions, 
as Hurricane Katrina in the southern part of the United States demonstrated in 2005 
(Jakob and Methmann, 2007: 26-27).
The United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (2015) reported that 
annually on average 21.7 million people have been displaced due to weather-related 
issues between 1995 and 2015. However, a database which documents forced migration 
caused by climate change does not currently exist. Thus, the full extent of the problem 
remains unclear (EFJ, 2017: 14). Nevertheless, if climate change cannot be stopped, as 
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many as 2 billion people might be affected by the year 2100 in one way or another 
(Hadlock, 2017).
The legal status of climate refugees
The Geneva Convention of 1951 does not cover climate refugees, born as it was in the 
context of the Second World War. Therefore, only people who are “forcibly displaced 
across international boundaries each year due to well-founded fear of persecution and 
violence” are treated as officially recognized refugees. Indeed, even if it is an important 
agreement on human rights, it is incapable of dealing with the climate change issue. In 
Europe (and the world at large), only two countries (Sweden and Finland) accept 
environmental refugees in principle. The UNHCR, which is usually responsible for 
refugees, does not have neither the required mandate or the resources to deal with the 
issue of climate change. Therefore, an international agreement is needed. (EFJ 2011) 
Demographic situation in Africa & Europe
Africa is the fastest growing continent. In the year 2015 the population of Africa was 1.2 
billion. By the year 2050, population size is expected to double to approximately 2.5 
billion people. This tremendous growth rate is expected to happen even if the fertility 
rates decrease significantly in the near future. Africa has the largest number of young 
people in the world and this will ensure that the continent will play an important role in 
the  coming  decades.  At  the  same  time,  Europe’s  population  is  expected  to  shrink 
continuously over the coming decades, and by the year 2050, Europe’s population size is 
expected to decrease by some 30 million people (UN, 2015: 1). Given this trend, the 
detrimental consequences of climate change are likely to be much more pronounced in 
Africa, especially compared to Europe with its decreasing population size. 
Case study: East Africa
In the most pessimistic scenario, East Africa is going to be one of the major source regions 
of climate refugees in the coming decades, with some 10.1 million climate migrants by 
2050. The Lake Victoria Basin, one of the biggest sources for fresh water in East Africa, 
is expected to become a destination for in-migration (i.e., migration to a destination within 
the region). Other in-migration hotspots will be the highlands of Ethiopia, Lilongwe, and 
the capital of Malawi. The areas which will be affected by out-migration are Kenya and 
Tanzania, western Uganda, and parts of the northern highlands of Ethiopia. Due to its 
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high population growth rates, even areas with high out-migration will see absolute 
increases in population size (World Bank, 2018: 79).
The population growth rate has in the past been remarkable in East Africa. Other 
demographic changes in East Africa are due to urbanization and internal displacement 
resulting from conflicts and droughts. These changes may accelerate due to further 
increases in population and a less habitable living space (IOM, 2015). Overall, the East 
African population is expected to rise from 422 million in 2010 to 676 to 786 million in 
by the year 2050 (World Bank, 2018: 82).
According to the World Bank, refugee hotspots will start to emerge in East Africa 
by the year 2030. This trend will intensify and spread over the whole region by 2050. The 
causes are deteriorating water availability and poor crop yields. In coastal regions, rising 
sea levels, the decreasing availability of arable land, and storm surges will be the main 
factors. Coastal regions are expected to lose a total of 150,000 to 750,000 people by the 
year 2050. Thus, people will start to move to regions which are less affected by climate 
change – mainly urban areas (World Bank, 2018: 84-87). Consequently, the population 
in urban regions will multiply from 100 million to cca. 350 to 450 million people by the 
year 2050. This development has already started and is mainly an effect of the rapid birth 
rates in East Africa. Climate change is not a factor yet but will amplify the problems in 
the region in the upcoming years (World Bank, 2018: 84-87).
In general, climate change will have an impact on the poor and hungry that is hard 
to foresee. According to the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), 
the Sub-Saharan region is under great risk of undernutrition, since the region is very 
reliant on farming. Smallholder farms, approximately 500 million of them, produce about 
80 percent of the food consumed in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia. 70 percent of the very 
poor live in rural regions. Therefore, they are highly dependent on agriculture and 
farming. Droughts and other extreme weather events will make it increasingly difficult 
for them to be self-sustaining (IFAD, 2011). Globally, the agricultural sector has 
undergone significant industrialization, but Africa has mostly remained an exception. 
Less effective farming activities in countries with fragile economies and low 
resilience, which cannot afford farming at the highest possible standard, will result in 
price increases for staple foods like grains or crops (Western et al. 2015). Consequently, 
food insecurity and poverty will increase continually. Food supplies will no longer meet 
the demand, which will mostly affect the low-income part of the population. By the year 
2050, the price of maize, rice, and wheat could increase by approximately 30 to 100 
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percent (IFPRI, 2010: 52-84). The World Bank analyzed the impact of price shocks in 
terms of food and nutrition and found that 160 million people (90 million in rural regions) 
had become extremely poor and another 63 million people were malnourished in the wake 
of the food crises of 2008. (De Hoyos and Medvedev, 2009: 13)
The Climate Change Exposure Index (CCEI) shows that Sub-Saharan Africa is at 
the highest risk of changing weather patterns since 17 of the 20 countries in this area are 
economically very reliant on agriculture. 30 percent of the GDP is derived from the 
agriculture sector in countries such as Sierra Leone, Liberia, Central African Republic, 
Guinea-Bissau, Burundi and Rwanda. None of these countries have the capacity to 
adequately combat the consequences of climate change (Maplecroft, 2016). In Nigeria, 
Somalia, South-Sudan and Yemen, over 20 million people are starving due to food 
insecurity caused by droughts (EFJ, 2017: 26). However, the situation is not new in 
Africa. East Africa has suffered droughts in 2005, 2006, 2008, 2011, 2015, 2016 and 2017 
(African Arguments, 2017). Recently, researchers found that the latest droughts are 
related to climate change (UNOCHA, 2017). In 2016, the food supply in the region 
reached a critical state – up to 24 million people were living in a state of permanent food 
insecurity (UNOCHA, 2016). A study from UNICEF in 2017 stated that 880,000 children 
were permanently undernourished and 5.5 million were in danger of hunger. This affects 
the state of public health as well, and the shortages in food supply, together with changes 
in weather patterns, are thus linked to outbreaks of yellow fever, malaria, cholera and 
measles (UNICEF, 2017). Overall, the following countries have been affected 
particularly by this crisis: Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Burundi, Uganda, Djibouti, Rwanda, 
Sudan, South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo (UNOCHA, 2016). The 
worst catastrophe is taking place in South Sudan. According to the UN, in 2017, as many 
as 100,000 people were undernourished and 1 million people died from hunger. Every 
seventh person had to flee due to a combination of starvation and armed conflict (UN and 
FAO, 2017).
Climate change intensifies political, economic, social and demographic problems, 
and the tensions within the society and the struggle for scarce resources, such as food 
supplies, or access to fresh water. This could lead to the outbreak of new conflicts, even 
full-blown civil wars (Burke, Hsiang and Miguel, 2015; Scheffran, 2012; PCC, 2014; 
Norwegian Refugee Council, 2008). 
According to Harris et al. (2013), natural disasters fuel existing conflicts. 
Schleussner et al. (2016) found a coincidence rate of 9 percent between armed conflicts 
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and disasters (like heatwaves or droughts) between 1980 and 2010. In ethnically 
fractionalized countries, the figure was even higher, at 23 percent. Almost two-thirds of 
armed conflicts since 1946 have been along ethnic lines (Schleussner et al., 2016). In 
2008, the increase of food prices led to riots and violence in 48 different countries (FRPI, 
2014). Therefore, North and Central Africa are potential hotspots for armed conflicts in 
the future, since most countries in this area will suffer from climate change, and are 
strongly fractionized into different ethnic, religious and social groups (EFJ, 2017: 29). A 
study from 2009 found that climate change effects and armed conflicts in the Sub-Saharan 
region are highly correlated to each other. Especially in warmer years the probability for 
war increases significantly; this suggests that an increase in armed conflicts of more than 
50 percent may be expected by 2030 (Burke, 2009). Werrell and Femina (2015), who 
have analyzed the Syrian conflict, pointed out the importance of climate change in the 
ongoing conflict on Syria as well. Climate change was not the trigger for the conflict – as 
it is a complex political, economic, and geopolitical battleground – but it definitely had 
fueled the conflict (Werrell and Femina, 2015). 
Discussion
On the basis of current climate tendencies, climate change is expected to play an 
important role in migration from Africa to Europe. East Africa, and the Sub-Saharan 
region, is expected to be struck particularly hard. Indeed, more climate-friendly policies 
could dampen the impact global warming is set to have, but it is unlikely that the 
international community will be united towards an emission-free world in the near future. 
Thus, the question should no longer be how climate change, with all its consequences, 
could be prevented, but rather how to organize life to cope with it. 
The key factors of the interrelated processes of climate change and population 
movements and some of the central observations of this paper thus are: 1) climate change 
exists and will lead to displacement – only the extent remains unclear; 2) climate change 
will affect the African continent, especially the Sub-Saharan region, very negatively; 3) 
the coasts and regions which will be affected by climate change will become inhabitable; 
4) Africa is the fastest growing continent by population; 5) new armed conflicts and civil 
wars will very likely emerge in the crisis regions; 6) distribution battles for scarce 
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resources will result from climate change; 7) most of the displacements will happen 
internally, but a significant number of climate refugees will also flee to Europe.
Recommendations & challenges
Since most of the figures in this article are estimates of future values, it may be reasonable 
to expect the worst-case scenario, because the measures which must be undertaken to stop 
forced migration to Europe would only be efficient and effective if less people are making 
their way to Europe than expected.
Approximately 86 million people in Africa may be forced to flee from their 
country of origin in the coming decades. Not all of these people would want to come to 
Europe, but the actual number of those choosing to attempt the journey will depend in 
part on the decisions of the international community in the upcoming years. 
The refugee crisis of 2015 already showed that the relatively modest number of 1 
to 2 million refugees from the Middle-East overwhelmed European countries and the 
European Union as an entity – not in terms of the financial burden, but in terms of 
institutional efficiency and political stability. A significantly higher number would have 
the potential to disturb and possibly reverse the European integration process, e.g. with a 
view to the Schengen Zone and related cooperation. 
The Sub-Saharan region will not become completely inhabitable and some 
measures could even buffer the adverse effects of climate change. In order to prevent 
these adverse effects, huge funding programs would be required for the entire Sub-
Saharan region; however, most of these states are struggling with political and economic 
issues and it might take years – at least – to build a functioning infrastructure truly suitable 
for increased investments in the region. One of the main problems in this context is that 
most of these countries have authoritarian regimes who would be not willing to cooperate 
with the international community, if it does not accept their conditions. Furthermore, it is 
very likely that  a  lot  of  money  will  vanish  into  “dark  channels”  (e.g.  corruption). 
Consequently, the funding has to be for a specific purpose, or those governments which 
are not trustworthy should be circumvented, by providing an unconditional basic income 
directly to every refugee. Nevertheless, even the best funding concept cannot undo 
climate change. Europe has to prepare itself for a significant amount of climate refugees 
from the African continent, even if all recommended policy initiatives would be 
successful. Therefore, it is necessary to identify as early as possible the regions in Sub-
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Saharan area where the effects of climate change are less profound, and which would still 
be able to provide sufficient living space. 
In spite of international efforts, mass migration movements are set to occur from 
the Sub-Sahara to North Africa – another politically unstable part of the continent. One 
possible approach could be to rent territory for a certain period of time from other states, 
as the UNHCR does when renting refugee camps, but on a much bigger scale. However, 
political cooperation is required in order to establish well-functioning infrastructure and 
to meet international legal standards. The case of Nauru, an island state in the Pacific 
Ocean, is a good example of mismanagement and political failure in this respect. People 
seeking asylum in Australia are sent to Nauru, where the Australian state is operating a 
“processing centre.” Asylum-seekers are living there under devastating conditions (e.g. 
water and food supply is scarce) even as Australia is spending a considerable amount of 
money and resources on running the centre (Doherty, 2016).
Yet the establishment of “visa/asylum centers” in North Africa, often put forward 
in current debates on migration as a solution, entails something similar, essentially. For 
this to work, the international community would have to start an urbanization process in 
less developed and less populated regions of North Africa – in order to make the 
permanent settlement of people from the Sub-Saharan region possible. In the first place, 
these new urban regions should be able to provide sufficient nutrition, fresh water, health 
care, education, cultural and even political participation, and security (including against 
the effects of climate change). Also, these new cities and urban regions should emerge 
without negatively affecting the current infrastructure and the political stability of the host 
country; a very difficult challenge indeed. 
It is impossible to predict the exact number of climate refugees and how the EU 
will evolve in the approaching decades, but with the most optimistic predictions, millions 
of people would make their way to Europe. The South-East-European countries (Greece, 
Italy, and Spain) will be most affected by this influx of people. Thus, an allocation 
formula for the whole of the EU may still be required because none of these countries has 
the capacities to solve this problem without the solidarity of other EU states. Although 
the EU has successfully established a resettlement policy with Turkey, the situation in the 
EU remains unsatisfying. In total, 120,000 refugees were planned to be allocated among 
member states, with a view, inter alia, to their economic conditions (EC, 2017). However, 
in 2017, only Malta has fulfilled requirements, while other states, such as Hungary or 
Poland, are not accepting a single refugee (Tagesschau, 2017). In the long-run, if the rest 
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of the EU still resists helping in an appropriate manner, security fences and further 
restrictive measures may be the consequence across the continent. 
The European Union needs more in the way of existing avenues for “controlled 
migration”.  As  part  of  this,  the  legal  status  of  climate  refugees may  also  need  to  be 
clarified, as well as terms of asylum for those concerned. 
Conclusion
Climate change is set to have a profound impact on humanity in the 21st century. By 2050, 
millions of people may be displaced and are expected to have to flee their country of 
origin. The African continent will be one of the major sources of such population 
movements because of its geography and demography. Furthermore, economic and 
political developments will amplify the effects of climate change. Thus, the number of 
armed conflicts and civil wars may be expected to increase in the future as a consequence 
of struggles for resources in the affected regions. One of the consequences of this 
development is that more people would attempt to make their way towards Europe. 
However, an early crisis prevention policy, by identifying and locating hotspots 
for in- and out-migration could dampen the adverse effects of climate change. Therefore, 
no less than an extraterritorial program of urbanization may be required to give people a 
viable alternative to migrating to Europe. Europe must also be prepared to accept but 
control better the inevitable future inflows of mass migration. One of the first steps would 
be the clarification of the legal status of climate refugees.
Visa and migration centers should be established in Africa in areas of permanent 
resettlement in order to find humanitarian solutions for asylum-seekers without giving 
them wrong incentives and false hopes. Otherwise, “uncontrolled” mass migration and 
thousands of deaths, as happened in 2015, will follow. Therefore, a shift in policy-making 
has to start soon in order to find appropriate solutions for the challenges involved.
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